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R E P L Y

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(George)
Mr. HEATHCOTE's Letter K

F R O M A N

H O N E S T M A N .

I N W H I C H

The Arguments are proved to be
delusive ; and the Facts untrue.

Mens incubuit dolori.

L O N D O N :

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R E P L Y

TO

MR. HEATCOTE'S LETTER

FROM


HONEST MAN

IN WHICH

The Arguments are proved to be
delusive; and the Facts untrue.

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130.





A

R E P L Y, &c.

S I R,

 T this Period, prolific with the Spreaders of Sedition among the People, Libels and Infamy on the best of Sovereigns, it is no Wonder to see a Man of your Choler step forth the Instrument of Faction and the Dupe of Party; who, by scattering the Seeds of Dissention, endeavours to weaken the Hands of Government, and impede the salutary Measures supposed to be in great Forwardness, for putting a Stop to the Effusion of human Blood. It is true, Sir, you profess a zealous Regard for the real Interest of your

B Country ;

Country; and so do all the Party under whose Banners you have enlisted; but Men who know them have found that they are not acting from any settled Principles, from any just Motives of national Benefit, or from any generous Sentiments of Honour; but without any Compunction of Shame, or Remorse of Conscience, obstinately pursuing the Dictates of rancorous Malice, at the Expence of every moral and social Virtue, and the Welfare of their Country.

Opposition to the Measures of Government, whether good or bad, is no new Thing in this or any other Country, where the People have so large a Share in the Legislature. For wherever that Circumstance is found, the Materials for the Advancement of private Views occur: And in Proportion to the Importance of such a Country, Subjects, ambitious of Preferment, have more Incentives to urge them on to Pursuits of this Nature, more Instruments to assist them in their Undertaking, and more Pretexts to delude and to impose upon the Multitude. The Employments in such a Country must of Necessity be numerous and lucrative; the Dangers from its Neighbours greater; their Jealousy and Ill-will more to be apprehended: and consequently, with more Privacy and Caution counteracted. This enables artful Men to raise Murmurs against the most necessary Measures of the State, and
to

to quarrel with the best Means of public Security, with a manifest Advantage; because it is easy to dispute the Wisdom of those Measures, which can never be entirely disclosed till they are fully executed; and the Poison infused into People has performed its Operation, before the Nature of the Thing can possibly admit a Detection of the Falsities and Misrepresentations employed against them; while the Public, already prejudiced, never give themselves the Trouble to examine what is past; either taking more Delight in the Discovery of Error, than in the Pursuit of Truth; or not having the Means furnished with equal Industry, or being diverted by some fresh Objection, started to some new Conduct. In Proportion to the Riches of any Country, Poverty becomes more pressing upon many by a natural Contrast. In all such Countries the Wretched are certainly more wretched, than in others which flourish less; because the Necessaries of Life are dear, and not to be had without that Industry, which Numbers will be found to want, in all Places, however opportune the Means of Employment may be; and Men of this Kind may be more industrious in a Faction, which is carried on by Noise, Drunkenness and Riot, when they can be so in Nothing else. In all trading Countries the Prospect of Gain allures many to adventurous Under-

takings above their Abilities, by which some must be undone ; and those never fail to attribute to Mismanagement of Government those Evils which arise from their own Sloth, Incapacity or Avarice.— Again, in such Countries, the Luxury of some induces others to follow them in the same Expence, to the Ruin of themselves and of their Families, and the Generality of these unite in Views of a like Nature. As in all populous Countries, from a Variety of Distress, such Objects must be very numerous ; so from the very Numbers of a People alone, Faction always derives a great Advantage ; since from the Difference of Dispositions, with which Men are born into the World, some will infallibly arise from Time to Time, framed by Nature itself of a restless and discontented Temper ; formed, whether they have Cause for it or not, to be as well a Torment to themselves, as a Plague to the Society in which they live. Nor can Opposition, right or wrong, want even Property to gild it over and to grace it ; for Men arising from the lowest Level of the People, and advancing into considerable and easy Fortunes, are, by natural Consequence, too often led to conspire against that very Felicity, Peace, Quiet, and Prosperity, to which alone they have owed their Existence. Arrogance and Pride, without more than a common Share of Understanding, are the
universal

universal Product of all hasty Advancement. These Men repine at what they never had Leisure before to consider; that there is still a Difference between their Condition and that of another Rank, which they cannot remedy by all their Efforts to exceed them in Expence. This something, which they find still wanting, sours them with their own State, and inclines them to fall in with any popular Discontent; partly, to gratify their Vanity, in insulting those above them; and partly, to create a Chaos, out of which they hope to emerge upon a Level with those they envy. From whence the Observation holds most true, that all Nations, in Proportion to their Encrease, grow turbulent and factious; and from this Quarter arise those levelling Schemes, in the Contention for which, sooner or later, Anarchy ensues; and, in Process of Time, the Loss of that real Liberty, whose sacred Name is so often speciously prophaned by Malice and Ambition. Even Liberty itself the more perfect it is, produces these Effects more strongly; for Wantonness and Licentiousness, which are its evil Genii, tempt all depraved Tempers to abuse it, and expose many to the Lash of the Laws, and to the just Indignation of Power, which none who feel, forgive, however they deserve it. At the same Time, the natural Tendency in all Mankind to expect more Favour than they merit,

merit, provokes unjust Resentments against Government, and a certain Infirmary (of which we all in some Degree partake) to be uneasy with what we have, and to endeavour after more, inclines Multitudes, either out of Views of private Benefit to themselves, or general Views of Encrease of Privilege to the Order in which they stand, to follow any Set of Men, who take the Lead in Opposition of any Kind. All these move by a secret Principle to that Quarter where it erects its Standard, be it just or unjust, be it to save or to destroy their Country. It is obvious from hence, and it is a Truth that cannot be disputed, however it may affect the Credit of many pretended Patriots, that the *discontented Party* of all Denominations consist *in general* of Men of no Principle.

Finding you, Sir, in the Lists of this Party, I consider your Pretensions to national Interest as Shadows of Delusion, the better to administer the Poison that is to promote the Work of alienating the Minds of his Majesty's Subjects, and ruin their Confidence in his Government.

Your confessed Motive for troubling the World with your long laboured Letter, is your great Fear that the Peace now negotiating will be a bad one; and your Authority for suspecting such a one, is a pretended List of the Preliminaries, printed in the *London Evening-Post*, of the second of September.

tember. Now, Sir, would any Man of common Sense, who really wished well to his Country, have thought a String of Paragraphs in the *London Evening-Post*, a sufficient Authority for believing there *would* be a bad Peace; and upon that *Belief* have ushered ninety tedious Pages into the World, inflated with trite Argument, and the wild distracted Fancies of a turgid Imagination. A Paper which is known to never receive any Thing from those in Power, and which is only remembered by having once been an Incendiary. But, supposing that the *London Evening-Post* had been a Paper of Reputation, and on that Account it had been conjectured that there were *some Truth* in those Preliminaries, could you, Sir, be so weak as to think, they could possibly be the real ones, when they carry upon the Face of them such Evident Marks of Falsity and Imperfection? Though I must take the Liberty, Sir, of believing you are destitute of Candour; yet I will not be so uncharitable as to think you totally bereft of Reason; and on that Account it is that I cannot but consider the Design of your Letter is to favour the Views of a Faction; by inflaming, not serving your Country. But, Sir, I will point out to you the Impossibility of those Preliminaries being the genuine ones, which were thus given in the *London Evening-Post*.

The

“The *English* to have all *Canada* ; the River *Mississippi* to be the Boundaries.

The *French* to retain the Privilege of sending as many Ships as they please to *North-America* ; in which Trade they usually employed annually between 1200 and 1500 Sail.

The *French* to enjoy the Fishery they had before the War ; and to be given the Island of *Cape Sable*, for drying their Fish. Likewise, to have a Fishery on the Banks of *Newfoundland*, with a Settlement on the West Side of that Island for the Purposes of drying, &c.

Martinico, *Guadalupe*, *Marigalante*, and *St. Lucia* to be restored to the *French* ; *Tobago*, and the rest of the neutral Islands, to be ceded to *Great-Britain*.

The *French* to have three Settlements in the *East-Indies* ; *Pondicherry* to be one of them.

Minorca to be ceded to the *English*, and *Belleisle* to the *French*.

Senegal to remain with the *English*, and *Goree* to be restored.

The *Havannah* also, if taken, to be restored to the *Spaniards*.”

It is hard to determine whether there appears a greater Want of common Knowledge in this Bungler, who patched up these Preliminaries, or of Discernment in you, Sir, who have believed them to be true.

With

With Respect to the first Article, it is pleasant to observe, that the River *Mississippi*, even at its very Head, is above 300 Miles distant from *Canada*, and after running a Course of two Thousand, all the Way farther and farther from *Canada*, it falls into the Gulph of *Mexico*, opposite the *West-Indies*. How then can this River be made the *Boundaries*, or even any Boundary of *Canada*? You, Sir, might have seen this Absurdity; and having found the very first Article a Thing impossible, any Man of Candour and Reason would instantly have judged the Whole a Piece of Forgery: But, you, Sir, perhaps, was *determined* to believe.

There is another glaring Absurdity, *viz.* “The *French* to retain the Privilege of sending as many Ships as they please to *North-America*, in which Trade they usually employed between 1200 and 1500 Sail.”

Now this Article must mean the same as the following, or it is unintelligible.

“The *French* to enjoy the Fishery they had before the War, and to be given the Island of *Cape Sable* for drying their Fish. Likewise, to have a Fishery on the Banks of *Newfoundland*, with a Settlement on the West Side of that Island, for the Purposes of drying, &c.”

Could you, Sir, take both these Articles together, and insert them in your Letter, and not perceive they were absolute Non-

C

sense?

sense? Is it not very plain, that the first must mean the same as the Second, or the first can have no Meaning at all? For the *French* can hereafter send no Ships to *North-America*, that we have any Right to limit the Number of, but what must be employed in the Fishery, as *Canada* is in our Hands.

Having pointed out two such palpable Absurdities, I think I may be allowed to assert, that those pretended Preliminaries were never drawn up by any better Hand than a common ignorant News Collector. Perhaps, with Respect to the rest of the Articles, you will continue in your present Opinion of them; because the Time is not yet come for publishing by Authority the the *true* Preliminaries. But, surely, if he who framed those in the *London Evening-Post*, knew no better than that the River *Mississippi* was to be the Boundaries of *Canada*, how ignorant must he be of the rest? Besides, there is not a single Stipulation about *Germany* or *Portugal*. Could you imagine that our Ministers would agree to such a String of Preliminaries, and mention nothing about either of those Places? This is another very strong Reason, which any Man of common Discernment would have instantly given for those Preliminaries being absolutely false, and unworthy further Attention. But you, Sir, who only just seem to doubt their Validity, lay them down
as

as a Piece of solid Superstructure, and thereon erect the heavy Fabric of your Pamphlet.

The Cessions of *Guadelupe* and *Goree*, and Part of the Fisheries, are your principal Points; therefore, of them I shall take the most particular Notice: Only previously observe, by Way of Antidote to your general Scope, that every one is sensible a Peace *must* be concluded on some such like Terms; therefore, a Clamour is raised against the Ministry, for doing what no Men in the same Situation can avoid; for negotiating a Peace with the Enemy, when, according to their own Account of the Preliminaries, it appears they are better than those which Mr. *Pitt* agreed to.

Your first Care is to give us an Account of the *English* and *French* Imports of Sugar, and their Exports of it to the Continent of *Europe*; observing in the Conclusion, our Decrease in that Exportation (before the War) and the great Advantage *France* thereby gained over us. In those Accounts you have omitted the Exports from *Portugal*, which is a very considerable Article. *Portugal* supplies with Sugar the *Italian* States, and almost all the Places up the *Mediterranean*, and even sends to *Hamburgh*, &c. several Vessels annually. This, Sir, is *one* Fact which greatly lessens your exaggerated Account of *French* Exportation to the Markets of *Europe*: And,

as you have taken no Notice of this very material Article, I hope, it will be sufficient to prove you, not only erroneous in your Calculations, but shew that there is no relying on what you have advanced. In proving, or rather attempting to prove, that *France* has greatly the Superiority over us in the supplying of foreign Markets, you have remarked, that our Exportation of Sugars has considerably decreased; but have not given us the Causes of that Decrease: I shall, therefore, do it, in order to set this Matter in a true Light; and likewise shew that *France* has no Advantage over us in our Sugar-Colonies.

An

An Abstract of the Advantages and Disadvantages which the British and the French Sugar-Colonies have, or are under, with Respect to each other.

The superior Advantages
French British

By the natural Fertility of their Lands	} None	None
By the Freshness of their Lands	} Some	{ ballanc'd by Negroes
By the disproportionable Num- bers of white Servants	} £. 60,000	
By the Supplies of Negroes	{ Applied to bal- lance 2d Article	{ Some
By the Supplies of Beef, Pork, &c. from Ireland	} None	None
By the Supplies of Provi- sions, Lumber, &c. from North-America	} None	None
By Taxes	£. 40,000	
By Melasses and Rum	£. 50,000	
By Freight	£. 80,000	
The general Ballance in Favour of the British Sugar Plant- ers, is, per Annum	{ £. 150,000	

£190,000 £190,000

This

This Ballance is a Superiority of Advantage sufficient to have commanded all or most of the foreign *European* Sugar Trade, and to have secured Employment for three or four hundred Sail of *British* Ships; instead of which, our Sugar-Planters have for about twenty Years past been wholly taken up in fleecing this Nation by exorbitant Prices of Sugar, and have let the *French* take the foreign *European* Sugar-Trade almost to themselves. It was thus that we lost the supplying of foreign Markets in Times of Peace, and now in War, when we have acquired more Sugar Plantations, what Benefit do the People in general of this Island reap from them? Are not Sugars still at a very exorbitant Price? Who enjoy the boasted Advantages of these Conquests? A few *Individuals*.

It may be argued, that though the Sugar Plantations serve only for the Emolument of a few, it is better to enrich that few, than suffer them to revert to the Enemy. A Reply to this naturally leads me to a due Consideration of *Guadelupe*, in all Respects, which you, Sir, have made the principal Bulwark of your Letter, inveighing against any Cedure of it to the *French*; in which I shall make it appear, that it is not our Interest to keep *Guadelupe*, because it is of no real Advantage to us.

First

First then, let it be considered, that *Guadelupe* was surrendered but as a Deposit, and the whole Property of the Island acknowledged to be *French*; so that we can never acquire the *real* Property of it any more than we did of *Minorca*, whose Inhabitants while it continued in our Hands, always considered themselves as *Spaniards*, and were secretly our Enemies, while living under our Protection. The same was the Case of a *French* Colony in *Newfoundland*, whom thirty Years peaceable Protection could never make *English*; for, at the breaking out of the last War, they all considered themselves as *Frenchmen*, and acted as such to a Man. In this Light we ought to consider the Acquisition of *Guadelupe*, in order to be able to form a true Judgment of its Value; for, it is certain, that were it to remain with *England*, yet while it continues in *French* Hands, it cannot but be a precarious Possession. According to the Terms of Capitulation, it is well known, that it cannot be advantageous to us; and, were it settled as a Conquest, the present Inhabitants would always be discontented, and never become faithful Subjects, unless by Force of Arms, at a great Expence. For it is a Maxim, that a Country fully inhabited by any Nation, is no proper Possession for another of different Language, Manners, and Religion:

It

It is hardly ever tenable at less Expence than it is worth.

It has been said, that the Possession of *Guadelupe* would enable us to export £300,000, in Sugars; and this, Sir, I fancy has made you think so highly of its Value, and express your Abhorrence to the giving of it up. But, Sir, consider that though *Guadelupe* might enable us to export £300,000 in Sugar, will the Inabitants expend among us the Produce of that Sugar? No. It is well known that £100,000 will supply them with *British* Manufactures: What then is to be done with the remaining £200,000? Why, it will (supposing we can prevent the Introduction of *French* Manufactures, which is morally impossible) be spent in *France*, in the Education of their Children, and support of themselves; or else be laid up there, where they will always think their Home to be.

It is doubtful, whether, even our obtaining Possession of all the *Caribbees*, would be more than a temporary Benefit, as it would necessarily soon fill the *French* Part of *Hispaniola* with *French* Inhabitants, and thereby render it five Times more valuable in Time of Peace, and little less than impregnable in Time of War; and would probably end in a few Years in the uniting the Whole of that great and fertile Island under the *French* Government. It is agreed, on all

all Hands, that our Conquest of *St. Christopher's*, and driving the *French* from thence, first furnished *Hispaniola* with skillful and substantial Planters, and was consequently the first Occasion of its present Opulence. On the other Hand, I will hazard an Opinion, that valuable as the *French* Possessions in the *West-Indies* are pretended to be, and undeniable the Advantages *they* derive from them, there is something to be weighed in the opposite Scale. They cannot make War with *England* without exposing those Advantages (while divided among the Islands) more than they would, were they possessed of *San Domingo* only; their own Share of which would, if well cultivated, grow more *Sugars*, than is now grown in all their *West-India* Islands.

It should likewise be observed, that *Guadelupe* is an unhealthy Climate, and has already proved fatal to a vast Number of our Officers and Soldiers. The Retention of it will not annihilate the *French* Sugar Trade; for, after the Conclusion of the War, they will extend their Settlements in *Hispaniola*. Nor are we in Want of Land proper for Cultivation of Sugar, since it is well known, that great Part of *Jamaica* lies now uncultivated for Want of Hands; and considering the Expence of Lives in those Climates, we cannot well extend our Sugar-Colonies,

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without running the Risque of depopulating the Mother Country.

The Possession of *Guadelupe*, therefore, cannot be of that Importance to *Great-Britain*, which a few Individuals are endeavouring to blind us with. I have heard of many Arguments they have made Use of in Favour of it, and am afraid that their Plausibility has misled your Judgment, otherwise you would not be so warm for the Retention of that Island. Among those Arguments is one as ridiculous as it is false, and which I shall answer as a Specimen of what is so much urged by interested Parties, in Behalf of this Island. It is said, that its Situation is much better for a Trade to the *Caraccas* and *Spanish Main*, than any Island of our own. Now, to any one who has but a small Idea of Geography, it cannot be unknown, that *Tobago* (which, as one of the three neutral Islands included in the pretended Preliminaries, that we are to have) is in a much better Situation for a Trade with the windward Coast; and that *Jamaica* is far preferable, with Respect to the *Spanish Main*. What, then, is there in *Guadelupe* which is so extremely inviting? The Truth is, it is a Sugar Island ready cultivated, and therefore, at a small Expence, is productive of Sugar, which some Individuals find great Profit in. If this was not the
Case

Case, why did Mr. *Pitt* consent to the Restoration of that Island?

The Cedure of *Guadelupe* to *France*, is what I expect, and what I am inclined to acquiesce in; and so will every honest Man who recollects the Causes of our Dispute with *France*, and the Moderation expressed by his Majesty, in his Speech, *of not having entered in the War with Views of Ambition.*

For, unless we bear in Remembrance the Ends we proposed by taking up Arms, we can never ascertain the Terms on which it is prudent to lay them down again: And whoever enters into the Dispute without this Postulatum before him, may indeed amuse the Indolent, and mislead the Ignorant, but will never influence the Attentive, or convince the Intelligent.

It will be admitted, that we entered into this War to repel the Encroachments of the *French* on our Colonies, in *North-America*: We have happily succeeded in the Recovery of our Rights.

This being the Occasion of the War, it naturally follows, that the *first* Object of our Attention should be to secure our *old Rights*, that they may not be exposed to the future Encroachments of the Enemy, and involve us once more in a bloody and expensive War. The *second* Point the Negotiators should have in View, is, to consider which

of our Acquisitions it is expedient to retain, by Way of Indemnity or Reparation, for the Blood and Treasure we have expended in the Prosecution of our just Claims; or by what other Means we may obtain reasonable Satisfaction.

Among this latter Number, Sir, you reckon *Guadelupe* and *Goree*. Now it will be observed, that the Possession of *Guadelupe*, when we have got so many Sugar-Islands of our own, must carry with it the Air of Ambition; and as such will be considered, by every civilized People on Earth.

The next Article which falls under Consideration, is that respecting the Fisheries; in which, Sir, you have suffered yourself to fall into the Error of the *London Evening-Post*, which magnified the Number of Shipping sent by the *French*, to between 1200 and 1500; and upon this *slender* and *disputable* Information *only* have you endeavoured to instill Terrors into the Hearts of his Majesty's Subjects, exaggerated every Sentiment of Apprehension, and painted future Danger more terrible than the past. I will readily grant that your Rhetoric had been just, had we not taken *Louisbourg*; but as we *have*, and demolished its Fortifications, and there is not the least Likelihood of its being restored, there is no Probability of our being exposed to such Danger, as you represent; nor is a Cession of Part of the Fishery, big
with

with such future Evils as you have precipitately apprehended.

Although the *London Evening-Post* has said, that the Number of Shipping, which the *French* send annually to *North-America*, is between 1200 and 1500; and you have the Number on an Average 1350; yet I will venture to assert, that it never was known that the *French* ever sent such a Number of Ships to *North-America* in one Year. And to convince you, Sir, I will give you a clear and distinct Account of the *French North-American Fishery*, as it stood when they were in Possession of *Louisbourg*, from Mr. *Auckmuty's* Discourse on the Importance of *Cape-Breton*, by which, Sir, you will see how much you have exaggerated the true State of that Fishery; and I hope the World will see what little Dependance there is on your Calculations, respecting the Traffic of either the *French* or *English*. This Refutation may be further serviceable, as it will shew your partial Exaggeration on the Side of the *French*; which, whoever has read your Letter, may see your Views in so doing: And hence, I think it will be but Justice and Candour to lodge a Suspicion that from the same Motives *you have diminished the Number of the English Ships*.

From the Gut of *Canso* down along the Shore to *Louisbourg*, and from thence to the North-East Part of *Cape-Breton*, there are
here

here employed, at least, five hundred Shallops. And these required, at Sea and on Shore, five Men each; which amount to two thousand, five hundred Men: And sixty Brigantines, Schooners and Sloops, each of fifteen Men, make nine hundred Men more; which together make three thousand, four hundred Men. Allow these five hundred Shallops to catch 3000 Quintals of Fish each in the Summer Season; and the Whole is 150,000 Quintals: And the sixty Brigs, Schooners, &c. each 600 Quintals, which make 36,000 more. So that there is made at *Cape-Breton* annually of Fish one hundred, eighty-six thousand Quintals.

Now, to carry this Fish to *Europe*, to Market, there must be employed 93 Sail of Ships, of the Burthen of 2000 Quintals each, one with the other; and each of these Ships have at least 20 Men, which are 1860 Seamen. And these, added to the 3400 Fishermen above, make Five Thousand Two Hundred and Sixty Men, employed at *Cape Breton* only in the Fishery.

At *Gaspay*, *Quadre*, and other Harbours, mentioned in the following Estimation, there are Six Ships yearly, which, as they come out from *France* mann'd to catch their own Cargoes in Shallops, which they haul up and leave in the Country every Winter, till they return the next Spring, one with another may be allowed Sixty Hands. And, it has
always

always been allowed, that from *St. Maloes* and *Granville* they had Three Hundred Sail of these Ships in this Fishery, that Fish at *Petit Norde, Fishante, Belleisle*, and the *Gulph*; which will, all computed as above, (allowing those Ships, that so came out to make their own Voyages, to carry each 300 Quintals) be as follows: —

	Ships.	Men.	Quintals.
At <i>Cape Breton</i> —	93	- 5260	- 186,000
At <i>Gaspay</i> —	6	- 360	- 18,000
At <i>Quodre</i> —	6	- 360	- 18,000
At <i>Port en Basque</i> -	6	- 360	- 18,000
At <i>Le Foils Isles</i> -	3	- 180	- 9,000
At <i>St. Maloes</i> —	300	- 18,000	- 900,000
	414	- 24,520	- 1149,000

To which, add 150 Sail employed from *Havre*, &c. in the Mud-fish Trade.

These Ships staid, fitted out in *France* for their Voyages on the *Banks*, there till they were laden; unless they met with any Accident or Disturbance (in which Case they resorted to *Cape Breton* for Shelter and Supplies); from thence home to *France*. And it was, thus, frequent for them, when they had made their Voyages, to go into *Cape Breton* for Water especially, as they had no other Port.

In

In regard to the Value of this Branch of Trade, let the 1,149,000 Quintals of Fish be valued only at 10s. Sterling *per* Quintal, the prime Cost usually at *Newfoundland*, and it is worth

l. s.
574,500 : 00

And, to this, allow 3s. Sterling Freight *per* Quintal of it, in *English* Bottoms, to Market - - - -

172,350 : 00

And then the Fish only is worth - - - - -

£ 746,350 : 00

And let the 3116 and $\frac{1}{2}$ Tons of Oil, (which is the most that they produce) be valued at 18*l.* Sterling, *per* Ton, the Amount of it is - - - - -

56,392 : 10

As to Mud-fish, it is generally sold in *France*, at 1000 Livers *per* 1000 Fish; and then at 11*d.* Sterling *per* Liver, their value is -

178,750 : 00

And thus it appears that One Year's Fishery of the *French*, is worth Sterling

981,92 : 10

But according to your Estimation is exaggerated to - - - - -

£ 1,350,000 : 00

This

This great Branch of Trade, in a Manner, entirely depended on their Possession of the Island of *Cape Breton*; as it is impossible to carry it on without some convenient Harbour of Strength, &c. to supply, support, and protect it.

But now, that the *French* are stripped of that Island, where will they find such another *large* Place to dry such *great* Quantities of Fish on? It remains to be seen by the *true* Preliminaries what Part of the Fishery they are to have, and what Spot to dry on. I think, I have sufficiently proved that their great Nursery for Seamen, and consequently our Danger lay principally in their Possession of the Isle of *Cape Breton*, which they being now deprived of, must of Course be such a Wound to their Fishery, as never to be able to endanger our Welfare by any small Allowances or Privileges we may grant them in those Parts.—If these were not the Sentiments of Mr. *Pitt*, during the Negotiation, when M. *Buffy* was here, what Excuse can be made for his offering to cede to the *French* a Share of the Fishery?

Now in a few Words I will prove that you have greatly diminished the *British* Fishery. You say, “that from *New-England*, *Nova Scotia*, and *Newfoundland*, there are about 300 Sail of Shipping.” This is the whole Number you acknowledge, and upon this build your Terrors. Capt. *Fryer Hall*,
E who

who in 1731 (when *Nova Scotia* was hardly inhabited by any Thing but *French* Indians, and Consequently not so advantageous to us in the Fishery as now, being in our secure Possession, it must be) gave Evidence before the House of Commons, concerning the Extent of our Fisheries, said *that our Colonies employed 10,000 Men in the Fisheries*; and I have it from other Authority, which would do me the highest Honour to mention; that there were at that Time employed in the Fishery by our *Northern Colonies* 660 *Sail besides Boats, &c.* which Number of Men and Vessels I do not include among *those* which carried the Fish to *Europe*; nor is a Word mentioned about the Men and Vessels from the West of *England*, and other Parts of *Britain*; both of which are very considerable; and which, were they added to the rest, would exhibit such a Branch of the Fishery as would fully evince that we *have*, and are likely to *have*, the *Superiority*, while we have *Nova Scotia*, *Cape Breton*, and the capital Towns in *Newfoundland*; none of which are to be given up according to the Preliminaries you have quoted.

Now Sir, with Respect to *Goree*, another Place which the Preliminaries in the *London Evening-Post* has ceded to the *French*.

By the same Article it is stipulated that we are to retain *Senegal*, which all the World knows is preferable to *Goree*; and which will

will plainly appear by the following short and impartial Account of both.

Goree is a small barren Island, near *Cape de Verd* in *Africa*, about the Sixth Part of a League in Length; very narrow, and very low; surrounded by Rocks, and almost inaccessible. It is destitute of Wood; and the Inhabitants have no Water but what they preserve in Cisterns. Will any Man now think that this Island is of that Importance which you represent? or that its Retention in our Hands will make amends for the Mortality of our brave Countrymen in guarding it?

Senegal is a considerable Town, defended by a strong regular Fort; situated on the River *Senegal* in *Africa*. The Mouth of the River is defended by a Bar, and other Forts. There are a Multitude of other Settlements up the Country, belonging to it: All of which are productive of very valuable Commodities, which are put on board the Ships here; such as that important Article, Gum *Senega*, Hydes, Bees-Wax, Elephants Teeth, Cotton, Gold-Dust, Ostrich-Feathers, Ambergrise, Indico, and Civet; besides Negro Slaves. When this Place was in the Hands of the *French*, it is well known that we were obliged to buy our Gum *Senega* of the *Dutch*; who purchased it of the *French*, and set what Price they pleased on it for us. This Settlement is capable of being much

improved to our Advantage, by cultivating the Friendship which the *Moorish* King of the Country has frequently expressed for us.

It is now obvious, which of these Two Places is best, and which it is most for the Advantage of *England* to keep. It must be likewise obvious that the Arts which are made use of to embarrass the Peace, are fallacious, and calculated only to deceive the People, and inflame their Minds with dreadful Apprehensions.

Some have already precipitately fallen into the Snare; and these will, no Doubt, rationally ask, what have we been fighting for, since they hear such a Cry about what we are to restore, and hardly the very Names mentioned of those we are to retain? For the Sake, therefore, of Candour and Impartiality, let it be known, that we, even by those Preliminaries, obtain what we went to War for, *viz.* Security to our Colonies, by the entire Cession of the vast Province of *Canada*, the Possession of *Cape-Breton*, and of all *Nova Scotia*; likewise, all those interior and extensive Lands at the Back of our Settlements, which completes our great Empire in *North-America*, and will put such Power into our Hands as must ensure us the Acquisition of any of the *American* Islands, if at any Time hereafter we should be forced into new War. What else we are to have, let

let the Preliminaries, when published by Authority, make known.

Your Encomiums on the late Minister are as stale as they are inconsistent. You warmly blame the *German War*, and yet vindicate his Expression : “ That *America* was conquered in *Germany*.” I cannot pass over this Part of your Letter, without taking some Notice of it. It is, Sir, owing to that Minister’s Acquiescence, or rather his pushing the *German War* to an Extreme unknown to any of his Predecessors, and thereby plunging this Nation so many Millions in Debt, that we are at this Time almost necessitated to make a Peace. For, how are the Supplies to be raised for a Continuance of the War? What other Necessary of Life can bear being taxed higher than it is? What Commodity? In a Word, where is the Man who can find out Ways and Means for carrying on the War, without encreasing those Burdens on the People, which are already become insupportable? We see that, though *France* is reduced to a State of Bankruptcy, her Subjects are unshaken in their Attachment to their Sovereign. If *Great-Britain* was in the same Situation, would her People be equally silent over their Losses? We are already saddled with the most grievous Impositions, and all, (except a few Individuals, whose Particular Interest it is to be otherwise) wait with Impatience the Return of
Peace,

Peace, when we hope to see some of them taken off. *Britain* is already so drained of Men, that her domestic Trade and Tillage, are greatly suffering by the Want of Hands. The Return of Peace is, therefore, her sanguine Wish, as well to replenish her Coffers, as to promote her Manufactures.

With Regard to preserving *all* our Conquests, which is your *warm* Desire, I must say, that is impossible; and even Mr. *Pitt* himself did not hope to attain it; nor would any Man of Reason and Moderation urge it. I cannot, therefore, think such a Sentiment will be adopted after you, by any Man of Candour and common Sense; who remembers, that we entered into this War from Motives of Security, not Ambition; and therefore if we do not listen to reasonable Proposals of Accommodation, the War, on our Part, becomes unjust.

We ought always to bear in Mind, for what we entered into the War. But it is in warlike Contests, as in civil Argument; the Parties often contend with such Heat and Acrimony, that, in the End, they forget the Origin of the Dispute.

It is certain, that we engaged in this War to assert the Boundaries of our *American* Colonies: And we have been so fortunate as to recover our own with ample Interest.

But can we hope to retain peaceably all that we have acquired, even if the Enemy

was

was reduced to such Distress, as to be obliged to submit to such hard and inglorious Terms of Accommodation?

Would not all the *European* Powers be offended at our imposing such rigorous Conditions, grow jealous of our Greatness, accuse us of Pride, and the Ambition of universal Dominion?

Have not our Enemies been industrious to propagate such Notions to our Prejudice, and to instil a Persuasion that we want to lord it over our Neighbours, and become sole Masters of the watery World: That by Means of our naval Power, we may draw to ourselves all the Commerce of the Globe, and give Laws to the rest of *Europe*?

Since *Europe* has become a Kind of Republic, it would be highly impolitic, by insisting on unequal and injurious Terms of Accommodation, for any one Power to offend the rest.

An unreasonable Rigour towards a subdued Enemy, would make his Foes turn Neutrals, and Neutrals become his Allies. A Jealousy would be immediately excited, an Idea of a Ballance would take Place; and the combined Powers would, by a Kind of Instinct, be directed to keep an Equilibrium, without, perhaps, pursuing it as a System.

Besides, as a commercial State, we are not formed for Conquest, and should not attempt

attempt to enlarge our Dominions. Moderation is the best Support of a trading Kingdom.

We ought not, therefore, to listen to those violent Zealots, who are for insisting on haughty and unreasonable Terms. An equal and just Peace only, can be lasting and truly Glorious.

The Continuance of the War tends only to distress and ruin both Parties. Our very Triumphs may claim our Tears, when we consider the Purchase. It is to be hoped, however, that they will accelerate the Blessings of Peace; for, as *Archidamus* said to the *Æolians*, who were preparing to assist the *Argives*: — *Peace is good.*

I am, Sir,

Your's, &c.

P O S T.

P O S T S C I P T.

SINCE my Writing the above, I have seen Mr. *Wood's* Letter to the Lord Mayor; informing his Lordship that the Preliminary Articles of a Peace between *Great Britain, France, and Spain*, were signed at *Fountainbleau*, on the 3d of *November*. Upon the Publication of this Letter, another List of the Preliminaries have made their Appearance in the Public Papers; and though there is no Certainty (nor will there be any till the P——t meets) of their being the true Ones; yet they carry upon the Face of them more evident Marks of Authenticity, than those you was pleased to harangue upon. I shall remark on this Occasion, that supposing them to be nearly exact, it will be the most glorious Peace *Great Britain* ever saw; and will give more abundant Satisfaction to all His Majesty's faithful Subjects, than that Ultimatum of Articles which Mr. *Pitt* was going to sign, when M. *Buffy* was here.— They are as follow :

In E U R O P E.

1. *Portugal* to be immediately evacuated by the *Spanish* and *French* Troops.

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2. *Nieu-*

2. *Nieuport* and *Ostend* to be evacuated, and *Dunkirk* demolished.

3. *France* and *England* to withdraw their Armies out of *Germany*, and Regulations agreed upon for succouring their respective Allies in Case the Houses of *Austria* and *Brandenburgh* go on with their War.

4. *Minorca* to be restored to *England*.

5. *Belleisle* to be restored to *France*.

In *A F R I C A*.

6. *Senegal* remains with *England*.

7. *Goree* restored to *France*.

In *A S I A*.

8. The *French* may, if they please, rebuild *Pondicherry*, and have Settlements on the *Coromandel* Coast; but to be excluded from having any Establishments in the Kingdom of *Bengal*, except three *Comptoirs*, or Factories, with no more than 16 Men to garrison each.

In the *W E S T - I N D I E S*.

9. *Martinico*, *Guadelupe*, and *Marigalante*, to be restored to *France*.

10. *Grenada* and the *Grenadillas* to remain with *England*.

11. *St. Lucia* to belong to *France*.

12. The

12. The other Three Neutral Islands, *Tobago*, *Dominica*, and *St. Vincents* to belong to *England*.

13. *Spain* to have back the *Havannah*, and to cede to *England* *St. Augustine*, and the whole Country called *Florida*; the Right of the *English* to cut Logwood allowed; and the *Spanish* Claim to a *Newfoundland* Fishery given up: And we are to have the Island of *Porto Rico*.

IN NORTH-AMERICA.

14. The *French* are excluded from fishing in the Gulph of *St. Lawrence* on the Banks of *Cape-Breton*, *St. John's*, *Anticosti*, and *Gaspee*; but may erect Stages between *Cape Riche* and *Cape Bonavista*, to cure the Fish they shall catch on the Shores between the above Capes. They are to be allowed to have Harbours at *Miquelon* and *St. Peter's*; in which Islands they may have a Fort, with only fifty Men as Garrison, but subject to the Inspection of an *English* Commissary. None but *French* Ships to be allowed to touch at *Miquelon* and *St. Peter's*.

15. The Whole of *Canada* to be ceded to *England*; and the most valuable Part of what the *French* used to call *Louisiana*; the River *Mississippi* being declared the Boundary between the Colonies of the two Nations on the Continent of *North-America*; the *Eng-*

lish to have the Navigation of the *Mississippi* down to the Sea.

This Peace will overthrow the System of your Letter. It cannot but give Pleasure, because it is as glorious to *Britain*, as all her Successes in the War. It is in the common Phrase, *a good Peace*; such a one as must restore Harmony and Unanimity amongst all his Majesty's Subjects, and make the Glories of the present Administration exceed those of the past: It will release us from those heavy Burdens under which we so grievously labour; and it will open fresh Channels of Commerce for our Manufactures, which this bloody and expensive War has greatly injured. I shall only observe, that the Restoration of *Goree*, I have proved, to be a Matter of very little Consequence: It is only a Place of Expence; and *Senegal*, which we are to retain, is of the most Importance. *Guadelupe*, I have shewn, can never be made serviceable to the Nation in general, however advantageous it may be to a few Individuals: And the granting the *French* a small Share of the Fishery, can never endanger our Welfare, while we keep them from *Cape-Breton*. These were the three Articles you principally objected to. Let us now look on what we are to gain by the Peace. We relieve our Ally the King of *Portugal*: We obtain *Minorca*, which in Mr. *Byng's* Time was considered as a Place of the utmost Importance:

portance: We have our Right of cutting of Logwood allowed: We establish our Superiority of Power in the *East-Indies*: We have three of the Neutral Islands, together with the *Grenades*, the *Grenadilla*, and *Porto Rico*. We have likewise *Louisbourg*, all *Canada* and *Florida*, with all *Louisiana*, on the West of the *Mississippi*; which must for ever fix our great Empire in *North-America*, on a firm Basis; give us the entire Dominion over all the interior Countries, and secure our Frontiers from any future Encroachments; thereby establishing a lasting Peace throughout that Continent, and securing our great Commerce throughout the World.— This is a glorious Peace; and which every honest Man will approve.

F I N I S.

